This article relates the legal status of Mozambicans in South Africa from 1985 onwards to key findings of a demographic census taken in 1992, an environmental health survey conducted in 1993, and in-depth fieldwork in some of the surveyed settlements in 1995. The case study area on the border with Mozambique is typical of South Africa's rural former homelands, with the exception that it has a large and long-standing refugee population. The environmental health indicators for refugees are considerably worse than for their hosts, and in-depth fieldwork suggests that this can be attributed to their legal and political vulnerability. This raises issues for South Africa's Reconstruction and Development Program, as well as conceptual challenges for promoters of human rights. Este articulo relaciona el estado legal de los Mozambiquenos en Sud Africa a partir de 1985, a ciertas conclusiones claves de un censo demogr?fico que se llev? a cabo en 1992, como tambi?n a una encuesta realizada en 1993 sobre el estado del medio ambiente, y a un estudio de 1995 en ciertos poblados. El ?rea bajo estudio, la cual se encuentra en la frontera con Mozambique, es un ?rea tipica de las antiguas tierras patrias rurales de Sud Africa, con la excepci?n de que ?sta tiene una poblaci?n numerosa y duradera de refugiados. Los indicadores de salud ambiental para los refugiados se encuentran en un peor nivel que aquellos para sus anfitriones, y un estudio de profundidad sugiere que este hecho se puede atribuir a la vulnerabilidad legal ypolitica de los refugiados. Esto plantea ciertas cuestiones para el Programa de Reconstrucci?n y Desarrollo de Sud Africa, al igual que un numero de desafios conceptuales para aquellos que promueven los derechos humanos. 
The area is thus an ideal place for the newly eleeted South African Government's Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) to work, with its commitment to increasing provision of housing, water, education, and health services.3 This is a commitment both to creation of a healthier environment and to recognition of the rights of hitherto deprived communities.
There is however a serious danger that, in seeking to address the needs of the formerly disadvantaged majority within these areas, vulnerable groups within that majority will continue to be overlooked. Such areas-marked by their history as apartheid's dumping grounds, the poor pole of a polarized society-are often assumed to form homogeneous communities that are united in their poverty. Statements such as "Better health service management requires community involvement," with no real questions asked about the nature of the community, are common. 4 The assumption of homogeneity permeated the run-up to South Africa's local government elections in November 1995, with the African National Congress increasingly stressing the need for the community to take responsibility for planning its own future as a precondition for the success of the Reconstruction and Development Program.
The situation of the Mozambicans within the former homeland areas, as described in this article, serves to demonstrate that this assumption of a homogeneous community in which interests are shared, in which all enjoy equal rights, and in which all feel free to voice their concerns, is seriously flawed. Some nongovernmental organizations working in development have long argued that it is difficult to identify, let alone work, in a way that benefits "the poorest of poor."5 Vulnerable groups often seek to minimize drawing attention to themselves, while more powerful individuals and groups either block access to the vulnerable, claim to speak on behalf of all, or simply ignore the needs of the vulnerable.
How, then, does any agency or program intending to benefit the community as a whole identify those who are silenced? One solution is to run through a check list of commonly vulnerable groups. Toubia, for example, writes: Individuals and groups who wield least power need increased social and legal protection. Particularly vulnerable are women, the illiterate and poor the disabled, ethnic minorities, indigenous people and cfiildren. In our research and analysis of health and human rights, we must be particularly mindful of the vulnerability of these groups, and of other power imbalances that may prevail in a particular society. 6 The problem with such lists is that none of the groups identified is intrinsically vulnerable. Vulnerability may be transient and is nearly always context specific. In Rwanda the Tutsi, though an ethnic minority, moved from a position of power to one of vulnerability, and then back to power in the space of a few short months.
It is important therefore to identify the determinants of vulnerability that are shared by vulnerable groups. One of these, and the one around which the human rights perspective is based, is the failure to develop or, where it does exist, to implement, appropriate legislation to promote and protect the human rights of individuals. Indeed, the whole human rights movement rests on the premise that the power and vulnerability of specific groups relative to the state and to one another can be regulated and moderated through legal mechanisms, including bills of rights, constitutions, and international conventions.
In theory, therefore, an examination of the legal mechanisms in place in a particular country, and their implementation, should provide a means of identifying vulnerable groups and targeting resources to benefit the whole community.
This article briefly outlines the history of the Mozambican refugee situation and the case study area, followed by a description of the methodology used. The lack of legal protection afforded to Mozambicans in South Africa is highlighted. We then use a case study of settlement patterns and associated environmental health indicators of the Mozambican refugees and their hosts to examine the linkages between lack of legal protection, environmental vulnerability, and the prospects of health promotion and protection. For the purposes of this article environmental health is defined in terms of access to water, sanitation, fuel, and housing. 
Methodology
The first section of the study draws on documentary evidence and interviews with Department of Home Affairs officials. The remaining sections draw on four components of work conducted in the Agincourt fieldsite.
The first component was the 1992-93 round of an annual household demographic census. This census, currently being repeated for the third time, covers every household in 20 rural settlements. As such, it provides a clear picture of the population profile and of key health determinants, both of which are necessary for the development of primary health care services.13, 14 It also allows settlement-specific analysis and the identification of subgroups within the overall population, in this case refugees.
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The second component was an environmental health survey, conducted in the same 20 settlements in 1993. This provides a picture of those environmental factors generally considered essential for the development of primary health care, specifically: safe water supply, sanitation and waste disposal, fuel use, and adequate housing and shelter. '5 In each of the 20 settlements covered by the demographic survey, a random sample of 25 households was taken. This resulted in an overall sample size of 500 households, or 5.6 percent of all (8,896) households. A field team of 10 trained field workers drawn from the area conducted interviews with the most adult and responsible member available in each household.
The data were entered onto a data management computer program and aggregated by settlement. Initial analysis aggregated all settlement populations. Subsequently the results of this survey were combined with the findings of the 1992-93 census to allow comparison between refugee and local settlements. The five predominantly refugee settlements were compared with the 15 predominantly local/mixed settlements, in order to determine whether the results obtained could indeed be attributed to the difference in settlement type. 16 The third component of the study was a dialogue and feedback exercise of the major findings of the environmental health survey presented at a series of community meetings held in each of the surveyed settlements. The report that formed the basis for this feedback was translated into Shangaan, the local language, and a copy was distributed to the most appropriate local person, normally the induna (local headman accountable to the Tribal Authority), or the civic association chairperson.'7 Discussions at these community feedback sessions generated additional information and insights into the quantitative findings.
The fourth and final component consists of in-depth qualitative fieldwork which has been conducted in the area since April 1995 (fieldwork is still on-going). Table 2 ). The situation does not therefore fit comfortably into any of the three broad settlement types identified by Black as characteristic of refugee populations, namely "camps," "planned settlements" and "dispersed settlements."'3' There are no camps per se. The four refugee settlements were planned, in the sense that land was allocated to them. However, the only external assistance in terms of infrastructure was the provision of communal toilets by the then-governing Gazankulu administration. Settlement E cannot be considered planned, nor can it truly be considered an example of a dispersed refugee population. It is generally accurate to consider that in the remaining 15 settlements, refugees constitute a physically marginalized minority. This conclusion is supported by the findings of the environmental health survey. In terms of key determinants of environmental health-namely, access to water, sanitation, fuel, and housing, these refugees live in deprivation relative to their hosts, who are themselves a marginalized element of South African society.32
Results
Lack of Legal
Access to Water
The clearest outcome of this physical marginalization is poor access to water. The area surveyed has little ground-HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS water and no rivers, and is therefore largely reliant on piped water pumped from the nearby Sabie River. Although many settlements are linked into the pumped water system (all respondents reported access to street taps, although for some refugees this involves walking to the neighboring settlement), the reliability of the water supply is poor for the entire population. Overall, only 13 percent of survey respondents reported that water is always available.
Refugee household members walk 400 meters to collect water-more than four times the distance of 96 meters walked by household members in mixed settlements. Respondents in refugee settlement D were the worst off, walking 1,088 meters to collect water. 33 While the distance for mixed settlements is just within the 100 meters recommended as acceptable by Simmonds, Vaughan, and Gunn, the distances for refugees are clearly unacceptable and reflect the very low prevalence of yard taps in refugee settlements.34 Whereas in the mixed settlements, 36 percent of households on average have access to a yard tap, in the refugee settlements this is true for only 9 percent of respondents.
These distances are considerable if one remembers that the two major methods of transporting water are by carrying a 25 liter container on the head (51 percent) or pushing between three and four such containers in a wheelbarrow (45 percent). Many respondents use both methods, as appropriate. In only one household was an animal cart used to haul water, and in only one was the use of a motor vehicle reported. A larger proportion of refugee households than mixed settlement households collect water on a daily basis (see Table  3 ). The burden of this falls more heavily on refugee women than on their local counterparts. These refugee women also have less access to education than do women in mixed settlements.
Although in many households several people can be involved in collecting water, in the survey we concentrated on the two main collectors, described here as the principal and second collectors. 
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Waste disposal methods differ considerably between mixed and refugee settlements (see Table 5 ). The lower number of household pits may reflect the smaller plots upon which refugee households are settled. Settlement A, the refugee settlement with the greatest number of outside toilets, appears to be the most conscientious about waste disposal, with 29 percent of households reporting that they burn waste. Fuel Use Wood remains the most commonly used fuel, although a small percentage of the local population has diversified (see Table 6 ). The high percentage of refugees using wood conceals the fact that in three of the five refugee settlements, 100 percent reported using wood only. The refugee settlement (E) reporting the lowest wood use, 82 percent, is also the refugee settlement with the largest proportion of nonrefugees (31 percent). Diversification into alternative fuels is low, due to high cost and poor availability. Electricity, the most desirable alternative to wood, both from a cost and a health perspective, is likely to bypass refugees altogether. At the time of the survey (1993) electricity was used in two mixed settlements by 12 percent of respondents in settlement J and by 8 percent in settlement F, but nowhere else. Since then, ESKOM has begun an electrification drive throughout the area, but this generally excludes refugee settlements.36 For example, one settlement was electrified in September 1994 but the immediately adjacent refugee settlement was bypassed.
Layout and Accommodation of Living Space
In each household surveyed, the number of sleeping rooms and the number of people each accommodated was examined. In mixed settlements, there was an average of 1.8 sleeping rooms per household, equivalent to 3.9 people per room. The least crowding occurred in settlement G, with 3.3 people per room.
In refugee households the average number of sleeping rooms was 1.1, equivalent to 4.5 people per room. Interestingly, the worst crowding appeared to be in the mixed settlement J, with 4.9 people per room.
Life in a Legal Vacuum
These figures present a cross-sectional or two-dimensional picture of relative deprivation of refugees within an already poor host society. In and of themselves, the figures are of concern from a public health perspective.37
The third dimension, which emerged during the course of the community feedback sessions and subsequent in-depth fieldwork, is the socio-political-legal dynamic that underpins and aggravates this relative deprivation. Settlement E exemplifies this: although the 1992-93 demographic survey shows that this settlement is 69 percent HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS Mozambican, in many households at least one individual has managed to obtain a South African Identity Document, such that the settlement is referred to by some as "eMapasini," or "the place where people have passes."38 People now strongly resist the label "refugee," insisting that they are locals. The induna (headman) of the settlement, himself of local origin, categorically denies that there are any Mozambicans at all in the settlement.39
Nevertheless, settlement E demonstrates environmental health indicators similar to the four refugee settlementsin fact, of the 20 settlements it had the worst sanitation record. Asked why, residents attending the community feedback responded that they were unwilling to build toilets until their stands had been properly demarcated by the local authorities.40' 41 The prospect of this happening are low, as the district authorities do not formally admit the existence of the settlement. When in April 1994 the Water Committee for settlement E sent a delegation to the district authorities to discuss the water problem, the District Control Officer refused to accept that there was a problem, claiming that settlement E has a population of approximately 100 people, when in fact, the real number is over 1,300.42 For as long as the stands remain undemarcated, their inhabitants are merely squatters. 43 In neighboring refugee settlement D, the link between legal status and access to services came out clearly in a heated exchange over whether improved water supply or acquisition of Identity Documents (IDs) was the greater priority. One participant stated that:
If you haven't got your own [ID] how are you going to ask for water? You must get that thing first, and then you can go looking for water. Going for water is useless before you get that thing.44
The numbers moving out of refugee settlements and into undemarcated informal settlements are growing steadily. The closure of UNHCR's voluntary repatriation program in March 1995 appears to have been taken by refugee households as a signal that their future is uncertain. Large numbers of refugee households are migrating out of refugee settlements and seeking to disperse into less high-profile informal settlements.
Of the 59 new households that have settled in settlement E since the 1994 census, 41 were Mozambican. Of these, 10 had moved from elsewhere in settlement E, six had moved from two other settlements. Nine households had moved in from outside the survey area and a striking 14 households had migrated from the two immediately adjacent refugee settlements. 45 Settlement E, neither a refugee settlement nor a formal local settlement where people have some security of tenure, but a place where locals and Mozambicans collaborate in presenting a nonrefugee identity, in fact represents a transitional stage in peoples' attempted metamorphosis from refugee to recognized citizen. It demonstrates informal strategies acted upon to achieve formal status.
Discussion
The demographic distribution of refugees relative to their hosts, and the environmental health indicators associated with the two different settlement types, show Mozambican refugees to be a vulnerable subgroup within the overall population. Even when statistical significance cannot be shown, the trend of refugee indicators is consistently worse than that of the mixed settlements, strongly suggesting their relative vulnerability.
Subsequent in-depth fieldwork suggests that this vulnerability reflects, both directly and indirectly, the legal vacuum to which this group has been condemned, as outlined in the introduction. Indeed, at least three dynamics, all detrimental, have been set into motion by the refugees' lack of legal status.
First, most in-depth interviews, whether with Mozambicans or locals, have highlighted how lack of status has made Mozambicans vulnerable to exploitation in the workplace. Their resultant poverty relative to their hosts is shown by income and expenditure surveys conducted in the Mhala District over the last five years.46 Economic vulnerability in refugee settlements is reflected in low consumption of cash goods, demonstrated by the use of free firewood rather than more convenient energy forms, as well as relative overcrowding.
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Second, lack of certainty over the future acts as a deterrent to refugee investment in domestic infrastructure such as pit latrines. There is a corresponding lack of government and nongovernmental organizations' investment in public infrastructure such as water supply and electrification.
Even where people do wish to invest, they are hampered by their inability to access formally allocated plots of land. This explains both the relatively greater distance refugees travel to collect water and the dearth of yard taps and outside toilets in refugee households.
It should be added that lack of legal status puts refugees at the mercy of local decision makers, whose formal jurisdiction is not entirely clear. The decision not to electrify refugee settlement B, for example, was taken in consultation with the civic committee of the neighboring mixed settlement.
This has resulted in situations in line with the findings from elsewhere in Africa, as summarized by Bascom, namely that "Refugees in many settlements were not as concerned about the need for further assistance, but about questions of protection from abuse of authority by local officials, and about equity issues..." 47 Third, initial findings of the 1995 demographic census suggest that the continuing legal vacuum and uncertainty about the future is producing a new set of movements within the area, as refugees move out of refugee settlements and attempt to disperse into areas where they are less easily identifiable.
While moving from a refugee settlement into an informal one may lessen the risk of deportation, it does not bring with it any of the benefits associated with formal recognition, as the water committee's experience with the District Control Officer demonstrates. The blurring of identity that the lack of formal status forces upon people, in fact, serves only to drive problems underground.
Further, the findings dispel the notion that the poor form a homogeneous community. Below the surface of what initially appears to be a uniformly poor area of rural South Africa, there are in fact serious levels of relative deprivation, and under the guise of community-driven democratic decision making this particular sub-group suffers active discrimination. The political marginalization of Mozambicans in the former Mhala District, as in other areas along South Africa's borders with Mozambique, therefore poses a challenge to the agenda of community-driven reconstruction and development in which funding is allocated at least partly in response to expressed need. 8 Such settlements are in a poor position to voice their needs, and local settlements are unlikely to do it for them. It is more likely that Mozambicans will remain a ready scapegoat for any number of problems. Unlike the biblical scapegoat, however, the Mozambicans are not willing to be chased out into the desert.
Faced with such a situation, the RDP and other initiatives have three options: ignore the issue, try to remove the people, or accept that people are here and incorporate them fully into planning.
The first option might be feasible if the refugee population were about to move back to Mozambique. However, all indications are that the remaining Mozambicans, for a variety of reasons, do not wish to return to Mozambique. Left unaddressed, the public health concerns inherent in these longitudinal dynamics can only worsen, with likely implications for people in the area as a whole. The study of Husseinyeh village, a settlement of Bedouin Arabs in Israel, demonstrates striking parallels. Declared illegal in 1965, the settlement is still there. The study links relatively high levels of morbidity and mortality to poor water supply and sanitation. These in turn are attributed to Israel's lack of formal recognition of Bedouin Arab settlements. 49 The second option, forced deportation, is morally objectionable, politically difficult, and practically impossible. Forcible deportation would make a mockery of the voluntary repatriation that preceded it and would evoke bitter memories of apartheid's systematic forced removals-a parallel few governments would wish to see drawn.
Therefore, the third option, incorporation, requires serious consideration, both from human rights and from public health perspectives.
Conclusions
This article set out to discuss the deeper and fundamental connections between realization of human rights and health promotion and protection, in particular, the role of certain legal measures as a determinant of group vulnerability.50
A strong association has been demonstrated between lack of legal status and poor environmental health, suggesting that lack of status can serve as an indicator of vulnerability.
Clearly, the failure to grant the Mozambicans refugee status in the 1980s, and their inability to enjoy the rights associated with it, has led to relative vulnerability in terms of environmental health. This demands attention from a human rights perspective, and the case can be strengthened by drawing on public health arguments.
As the Mozambican case demonstrates, while the granting of status may appear to be a yes-no decision, the denial of rights sets into motion a whole series of socioeconomic and political dynamics that result in the formation of vulnerable groups. The resultant divisions within the community are of a nature that severely reduces the prospects of health promotion and protection in the case study area and in many similar situations. In other words, denial of rights has costs even for those in the host society who enjoy legal status: in other words a lose-lose situation.
The existence of particularly vulnerable groups dispels the assumption that the community is a homogeneous entity. This is problematic for ostensibly community-driven programs like the RDP, because formal legal recognition is primarily a political rather than a technical issue. However, the issue must be grappled with, particularly in the face of ongoing population movements that belie the notion of physically static communities. Whether people are labeled migrant workers, illegal aliens, or refugees; whether the area is rural or urban, the underlying issues remain the same.
There are essentially two options for dealing with such issues. The first is to try to limit the existence of potentially vulnerable groups by restricting the movement of people. This is the preferred option of most governments, despite increasing evidence that large-scale movements of people are by their nature difficult to control.
The second option is to accept that people do move and to therefore consciously address the links between status, rights, and health. Formal legal status-allowing freedom of movement with its associated economic opportunities; access to land and services, and sufficient security to justify the risk of investment in the host environment-is one of the fundamental prerequisites for environmental and social health. It is also fully consonant with the notion of human rights that are indivisible and not territorially restricted.
This second option runs counter to current practice, at the core of which, and contrary to the evidence, is the notion that the movement of people can be controlled. Persistence of such notions is hardly surprising, given that recognition, whether of refugees, illegal immigrants, or racial minorities, does not just challenge the "eurocentrism" and individualism of liberal human rights concepts as outlined by Otto: "recognition challenges the very notion of a static nationstate with a stable population and political constituency. 5i
The challenge for human rights activists, therefore, is to demonstrate that failure to grant status does not remove the issue, it merely drives it underground. Further, that the longterm social and political costs of denying status are likely to be higher than the costs of granting status. The challenge for politicians who accept this will be to find political tools as potent as the rhetoric of nationalism: perhaps South Africa's newfound self -image as a "rainbow nation" gives grounds for optimism?
